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SINCE THIS BOOK EXTENDS A research program 
that started almost 22 years ago, it would help 
the reader to start this precis of the book by re-
iterating the pivotal theses put forth before the 
publication of this book. The first thesis is that 
early vision, the first stage of visual perceptual 
processing, is cognitively impenetrable (CI) 
and conceptually encapsulated. The second is 
that some perceptual content is nonconceptual 
if and only if it is the content of CI states. The 
third thesis is that late vision, the second stage 
of perceptual processing, is cognitively pene-
trated (CP stands henceforth for cognitive 
penetrability) and involves hybrid contents, 
that is, it contains states that have both concep-
tual and nonconceptual content.  
Early vision is defined functionally and 
not neuro-anatomically, since both early and 
late vision engage largely the same neuronal 
visual areas, albeit in different time-frames. 
Early vision involves feedforward processes, 
lateral processes, and recurrent processes 
that are, significantly, restricted to visual are-
as and exclude signals emanating from cogni-
tive centers. Early vision lasts for about 120-
140 ms. after stimulus onset; its output is sit-
uated both at the subpersonal and personal 
level. Finally, late vision receives as input the 
output of early vision, which it processes in 
the light of cognitive signals that it engages in 
global recurrent processing. Its role is identi-
fying objects and categorizing them, alt-
hough some sort of initial, perceptual, cate-
gorization occurs in early vision. 
In all these themes the notion of CI was 
left largely underdefined since I followed the 
broad view of CP as the influence of cogni-
tive information on perceptual processing 
adding the qualification that a cognitive ef-
fect on perception should be deemed as a 
genuine case of CP if and only it is on-line or 
direct, so as to exclude indirect cases that af-
fect perception either before the onset of 
perceptual processing or after its termina-
tion. Since then, however, many colleagues 
have discussed CP in illuminating ways and 
contributed valuable insights on both its 
meaning and its epistemic role in perceptual 
processing. Moreover, a wealth of new em-
pirical evidence concerning perceptual pro-
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cesses and their timing have emerged that, 
occasionally, seemed to suggest that cogni-
tive influences on perceptual processes can 
take place very early on, undermining the 
thesis that early vision is CI. This book most-
ly aims to address these issues. 
I have often related CP to the impact of 
cognitive effects on the epistemic role of per-
ception when trying to answer the question as 
to why certain sorts of cognitive influences are 
not cases of CP, but I never attempted to link 
this concern to the view that CP presupposes 
direct influences on perception. To do all of 
these things, one first needs to discuss the epis-
temic impact of cognition on perception. In 
Chapter 1, I undertake a critical appraisal of 
the discussion thus far, examining in detail the 
main views of supporters of the two main 
camps, namely internalism and externalism. 
For internalists, the justification of perceptual 
beliefs by perception is independent of truth-
related factors. Externalists, in contradistinc-
tion, argue that perceptual justification is tied 
to externalist, relational factors that are truth-
related. The disagreement follows mainly from 
a difference about the content of mental, in 
general, and perceptual, in particular, states.  
For the internalist, perceptual content is in-
herently intrinsic to the viewer and does not 
constitutively depend on the viewer’s relation 
to the environment. The latter is causally im-
plicated in the formation of this content, but 
environmental information per se is not con-
tained in this content. Internalists think that 
the evidence on which a perceiver bases prima 
facie a perceptual belief, or the reasons percep-
tual experience provides a perceiver with the 
perceptual belief caused by the experience, con-
sists in the way the experience presents the 
world as being to the perceiver that is, in its 
phenomenal character. It follows that the justi-
ficatory potential and force of a perceptual 
state (that is, the range of perceptual beliefs this 
state can justify, and the degree to which is does 
so) depend solely on the phenomenal character 
of the experience; this sort of evidence is called 
phenomenal evidence. 
For externalists, perceptual content is in-
herently extrinsic, in that it constitutively de-
pends on the viewer’s relation to the environ-
ment at the time of the viewing act. For some 
externalists, the representational content of 
perception includes both phenomenal content, 
which is the phenomenal character (or part of 
it) of the relevant perceptual experience, and 
also a different kind of representational con-
tent, let us call it externalist content, which de-
pends constitutively on the perceptual relation 
of the viewer to the external world.  
For the internalist, cognitive effects on per-
ception may have bad epistemic effects that 
lead to ill-founded perceptual beliefs because 
they may engender an irrational etiology of 
perception, that is, an etiology that introduces 
an epistemologically speaking suspicious infer-
ence in perception, rendering the perceptual 
process irrational. Therefore, CP undermines 
the justificatory force of perception by vitiating 
the epistemic credentials of perceptual infer-
ences, which justifies coining this class of views 
“inferentialism”. In other words, CP down-
grades the justificatory force of perceptual ex-
perience. Underlying these views is the Analogy 
thesis, according to which 
 
It is possible in principle for an experience 
to depend on a desire, in ways that are 
structurally analogous to modes in which 
a belief that P depends on a desire, where 





For the externalist, CP downgrades per-
ception because it affects perceptual pro-
cessing in a way that renders the percept epis-
temically suspect by raising concerns about 
whether the percept reflects, or more or less 
accurately represents, the environmental evi-
dence, or whether it reflects more the contents 
of the cognitive states that penetrate percep-
tion. To the extent that for the externalist the 
epistemic impact of perception hinges on the 
relation of the content of the perceptual state 
to the environment, two viewers who face the 
same visual scene and share the same phe-
nomenal character may differ in the degree of 
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justification their respective perceptions con-
fer on them since they may be related differ-
ently to the visual scene. One of them may 
have a veridical perception of O being F, while 
the other one hallucinates that O is F. Their 
phenomenal contents are, allegedly, indistin-
guishable but since only the former is related 
to O, only she or he is justified in believing 
that O is F. Some externalists are sympathetic 
to the internalists’ intuition that since both 
viewers share the same phenomenal content 
there is a sense in which both are justified in 
believing that O is F; they have the same phe-
nomenal evidence. To accommodate their ex-
ternalist allegiance, the sympathetic external-
ists introduce another dimension of justifica-
tion that makes it possible to say that the two 
viewers are differently justified in believing 
that O is F despite having the same phenome-
nal evidence. 
I criticize internalistic views and adopt an 
externalist view. I have two main problems 
with internalism. The first is that it presuppos-
es that perception involves inferences; I have 
argued and continue to do so in this book that 
perception does not involve inferences, where 
inferences are understood in the standard phil-
osophical way, that is, as being discursive. The 
second problem is that internalism fails to ex-
plain and justify the intuition that CP is a genu-
ine epistemic problem because it may make 
viewers insensitive to environmental infor-
mation, despite Siegel’s attempt to couch the 
problem in terms of sensitivity to data. Any 
such discussion, necessarily in my view, relies 
on the assumption that perceptual states con-
stitutively, and not merely causally, depend on 
the environment. Another way to see why dis-
cussions of sensitivity to the data are better cast 
in an externalist framework is that the sensitivi-
ty of perception to the evidence is an index by 
which the reliability of perception can be 
measured, since reliability depends on how ac-
curately perception reflects the environment. 
Hence, the sensitivity of perception to the evi-
dence ensures that perception reflects the envi-
ronment. This talk about the reliability of per-
ception and about how this reliability is related 
to a more or less accurate reflection of the envi-
ronment in perceptual contents can take place 
only in an externalist framework. 
Almost all externalist accounts of perceptual 
justification emphasize the distinction between 
the phenomenal character of perceptual states 
and their intentional or representational con-
tent, and undermine the view that the content 
of a perceptual state is an intrinsic property of 
that state that, as such, is logically independent 
of what the perceptual state is about. This chal-
lenges phenomenal dogmatism or conservatism 
in that it paves the way for a notion of percep-
tual justification that is not determined solely 
by the phenomenal character of the perceptual 
experience viewed as an intrinsic property of 
the experience. This challenge, in turn, allows 
the introduction of conditions such as the reli-
ability of perception and its sensitivity to the 
environmental data to enter into discussions of 
perceptual justification. What unites externalist 
accounts of perceptual justification is a concep-
tion of justification that a veridical perceptual 
state that grounds the relevant belief provides a 
justification or grounding that is stronger than 
the justification that an illusory, or hallucinato-
ry, or a CP perceptual state provides for a belief 
with matching content. This justification is 
stronger in that imposes a further requirement 
in addition to the condition that the content of 
the justified belief should match the phenome-
nal content of the perceptual experience. Let us 
grant that when perceivers form a belief whose 
content matches the phenomenal character of 
their experience, they are doing the epistemi-
cally correct thing and exercising their epistem-
ic capacities appropriately. Nevertheless, this is 
not enough for the perception to ground the 
belief. Only veridical perceptual experiences 
can do that, which is why grounding is lacking 
in the CP cases. What underwrites all these ex-
ternalist views is that for perception to play its 
justificatory role it must be sensitive to the en-
vironmental input and reflect it accurately.  
In Chapter 2, I examine the definitions of 
cognitive penetrability offered by Pylyshyn, 
Macpherson, Stokes, Siegel, and Wu to assess 




synthesize them with my own views in order to 
come up with a more adequate definition of 
CP. My main concern is to explain the differ-
ences between direct and indirect cognitive ef-
fects on perception and to argue why the for-
mer but not the latter entail the CP of percep-
tion. To do this, I use the result attained in the 
previous chapter that a cognitive effect on per-
ception signifies CP iff it affects its sensitivity 
to the environmental input. Needless to men-
tion that my account owns much to the work of 
the aforementioned authors and especially to 
Stokes’s clear statement that CP is inherently 
related to the epistemic impact of cognitive ef-
fects on perceptual processing.  
I propose, first, a partial definition of CP fo-
cusing on the directness of the cognitive effects 
on perception. This runs as follows 
 
CP revisited: A cognitive state C cognitively 
penetrates a perceptual state P when C par-
tially causes P, and the causal chain from C 
to P is  
 
(a) mental and internal in the sense that it is 
contained entirely within the subject;  
(b) C does not act so as to merely select the 
input for P;  
(c) C affects the perceptual processes that lead 
to the formation of P in the sense that 
these processes use information con-
tained in C. The information contained 
in C is used by the processes that issue P 
in an online manner, that is, it is used 
during the course of the processes un-
derwriting P and it does not simply fix 
the values of some parameters that figure 
in the state transformations in which the 
processing in P consists. It follows that 
when C penetrates P, the conceptual con-
tents of C (or a subset of them) enter the 
contents of P;  
(d)  C may affect P in a top-down manner, or 
C may be imbedded in the processes that 
issue P. 
(e) The cognitive effects on perception should 
be such that if perception is CP, it is no-
mologically possible for two viewers (or 
for the same viewer at different times 
and circumstances), to have perceptual 
states with different contents while see-





CP is in general the influence of cognitive 
(including emotive) states on perception under 
certain conditions. This entails that cognitive 
states partially cause a perceptual state, where 
the causal chain is internal to the viewer. The 
condition that the causal chain be internal to the 
viewer is sometimes thought to exclude cogni-
tive effects mediated by attention, whether it be 
spatial or object-centered, from being instances 
of CP. This, however, is wrong since the atten-
tional effects on late vision are internal and 
ubiquitous and clearly affect perceptual pro-
cessing partially causing a perceptual state, 
which means that they render late vision CP.  
The proposed definition handles cases of 
indirect cognitive effects well, including pre-
cueing. Why should the indirect cognitive ef-
fects on perception be excluded from being 
cases of CP? I suggest that the reason why indi-
rect cognitive effects at any perceptual stage 
should not be considered as cases of CP is that 
by not affecting perceptual processes them-
selves, they do not affect the epistemic status of 
perception in a pernicious way and can be easi-
ly alleviated simply by asking viewers to refocus 
attention which results in their seeing the same 
thing given the same stimulus and under the 
same viewing conditions.  
This imposes a second condition that an 
adequate account of CP should fulfill. 
 
Epistemic Condition for CP: If perception 
(or a stage of it) is cognitively influenced 
in a way that either renders it unfit to 
play the role of a neutral epistemological 
basis by vitiating its justificatory role in 
grounding perceptual beliefs, or enhanc-
es its epistemic status, perception (or a 
stage of it) is CP. If perception (or a 
stage of it) is cognitively influenced in a 
way that does not affect its epistemic 
role it is CI.
3
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This is not a necessary condition for CI, 
which means that a perceptual stage can be CI 
even if attention affects its epistemic status in 
some specific way. The reason is that some 
indirect cognitive effects may downgrade per-
ception, but their effects are not pernicious 
because they could be easily alleviated, and for 
this reason they are not considered to be cases 
of CP. Covert attention, for example, may af-
fect the epistemic role of perception when it 
gives priority to some objects in a visual scene 
by marking them for preferential processing 
during late vision, but since its effects are easi-
ly countermanded, its role does not entail that 
perception is CP. If, on the other hand, some 
cognitive effects do not influence the epistem-
ic role of a perceptual stage, this stage is CI. It 
follows that a cognitive influence on percep-
tion is a case of CP if it undermines the epis-
temic role of perception in such a way that its 
effects are not alleviated simply by refocusing 
attention, whether it be overt or overt. The 
effects must be such that the epistemic role of 
perception is downgraded in a philosophically 
interesting way. This calls for a revised Epis-
temic Condition 
 
Revised Epistemic Condition for CP: If per-
ception (or a stage of it) is cognitively influ-
enced in a way that either renders it unfit to 
play the role of a neutral epistemological ba-
sis by vitiating its justificatory role in 
grounding perceptual beliefs in a philosoph-
ically interesting way, or enhances its epis-
temic status, perception (or a stage of it) is 
CP. If perception (or a stage of it) is cogni-
tively influenced in a way that does not af-




In view of the above considerations, it 
seems that the relationship between the direct-
ness condition, which relates the problem of 
whether a cognitive effect on perception entails 
CP to whether it affects perception directly, 
and the epistemic condition, which relates CP 
to the repercussions of the cognitive effect for 
the epistemic status of perception, is intricate. 
If cognition directly affects perception, the lat-
ter is CP. Let us put this as follows: CDAP 
(Cognition Directly Affects Perception)CP. 
Thus, the directness condition constitutes a 
sufficient condition for CP. Does it hold that if 
a process is CP then it is directly affected by 
cognition; CPCDAP? In other words, could 
indirect cognitive effects render a perceptual 
process CP? If they did, the necessary part does 
not hold, which means that the directness con-
dition is not sufficient and necessary for CP.  
This is the juncture at which the epistemic 
criterion enters the discussion. According to 
this criterion, if cognition either downgrades 
perception in a philosophically interesting way, 
or enhances its role, perception is CP. As a 
lemma, cognitive influences on perception that 
do not in any way affect the epistemic role of 
perception are not cases of CP. This excludes 
indirect cognitive effects on perception from 
entailing CP and allows us to hold that 
CPCDAP (the necessary part of the extend-
ed directness condition). It follows that the ex-
tended directness condition conjoined with the 
revised epistemic condition yield a sufficient 
and necessary condition for CP. Things are in-
tricate because, in the last analysis, the fact that 
indirect cognitive effects are easily alleviated 
stems from their being indirect effects that as 
such do not affect perceptual processing itself. 
It turns out that the directness condition entails 
a pragmatic property, namely, that the epistem-
ic consequences of the indirect cognitive effects 
could easily be alleviated, which when used in 
the context of the dialectic concerning whether 
CP has an epistemological consequence, allows 
us to draw the conclusion that indirect cogni-
tive effects do not entail the CP of perception. 
Having provided a definition for CP, in 
Chapter 3 I proceed to defend my thesis that 
early vision is CP in the light of some criticisms 
based on empirical work that has targeted the 
view that early vision is CI. This criticism is 
multifaceted addressing several parts of the ar-
guments for the CI of early vision. A first class 
of criticisms purports to show that cognition 
need not act in a top-down manner to affect 
perception but can do so from within the per-




the way the perceptual system uses certain 
principles to guide its processes, and from the 
fact that objects can be categorized very quick-
ly, which means that concepts may become 
components of perceptual contents very early 
on. A second class of counterarguments centers 
on recent evidence that recurrent processes are 
found in perception as early as 50 ms., a finding 
which is taken to entail that early vision is CP. 
Finally, a third class of counterarguments ema-
nates from various pre-cueing experiments that 
allegedly show that cognition affects early vi-
sion directly. 
I analyze all these counterarguments and 
argue, based on the same empirical evidence 
adduced against my theses, that not only do 
they not establish the CP of early vision, but, in 
contrast, strengthen the thesis. I discuss first 
the role of the “principles” that guide perceptu-
al processing and argue that there are various 
ways to understand the epistemic status of 
these principles. These principles are widely 
construed in the literature as merely causal 
connectors with no representational contents, 
or as some sort of tacit, non-representational 
knowhow, or as some sort of tacit, representa-
tional knowledge. However, irrespective of 
how one conceives of the information realized 
by the principles, the principles are not rules 
of inference that the visual system looks-up 
implicitly or explicitly to perform its interstate 
transformations, or premises used in such 
transformations. This is why I prefer to call 
them operational constraints to avoid the se-
mantic overtones of the term “principle”. 
Moreover, that perception relies on some op-
erational constraints to function successfully 
does not entail that perception is affected by 
concepts from within. In any interpretation of 
the informational content realized by the op-
erational constraints, if such content exists 
(because if they are merely causal connectors 
they are not states with contents), it is not 
conceptual content. Hence, the existence of 
some operational constraints hardwired in 
perception does not entail that there is some 
sort of knowledge that determines or simply 
affects perceptual processing.  
Second, concerning early categorization, I 
argue that it is a purely perceptual phenome-
non in which cognition plays no direct role 
whatsoever since the perceptual processes in-
volved do not use any semantic information. I 
assess, third, the arguments concerning early 
recurrent processing. I examine the empirical 
literature painstakingly and show that even 
though early recurrent processing does indis-
putably occur, it is restricted to local recurrent 
processing that does not involve cognitive sig-
nals and, thus, does not entail the CP of early 
vision. Finally, I discuss pre-cueing at length 
and argue that the evidence shows that it nei-
ther affects early vision directly, nor does it 
have any epistemic effects on early vision. 
Let us assume that early vision is CI, in that 
it affected by early vision only indirectly, and 
that late vision is CP. In view of the fact that 
CP is related to the downgrade of the justifica-
tory force of perceptual experience, does the 
CP of late vision, which produces the final ver-
dict of visual perception, that is, the percept, 
entail that CP undermines the justificatory role 
of perception, vindicating, thus, Hanson’s, 
Kuhn’s, Churchland’s and others’ view that 
perceptual experience cannot be a neutral arbi-
ter of the epistemic status of scientific theories 
and even of everyday perception? In Chapter 5, 
I address this problem.  
First, I discuss the epistemic impact of the 
indirect cognitive effects on early vision. One 
might insist that the indirect cognitive effects 
on early vision may highlight some information 
at the expense of others and this, arguably, may 
affect the epistemic role of early vision. Let me 
first note that for reasons explained in the 
book, I categorize preparatory effects along 
with attentional effects even though strictly 
speaking they are different in nature. I assess 
this claim by examining what happens when 
spatial and object-based attention indirectly 
affect early vision. With respect to spatial at-
tention, I argue on empirical grounds that no 
information from the attended visual scene is 
privileged; both targets and non-targets in the 
visual scene selected by spatial attention are 
taken in by early vision. All information pre-
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sent in it is equally processed; what spatial at-
tention does is to select a visual scene from the 
environment.  
In cases of feature/object attention, the in-
formation that matches the objects or features 
cued in the attentional command is indeed 
highlighted and receives a prior boost. Thus, 
the hypothesis concerning the identity of the 
feature/object that matches the cue likely will 
be the first hypothesis to be formed and tested 
during late vision since the cued information 
facilitates the formation of a hypothesis con-
cerning feature/object identity. Despite the en-
suing initial boost of some neuronal activity in 
the early visual circuits, however, early vision 
retrieves all the information in the visual scene. 
All this information, therefore, is there in the 
iconic image, that is, the image formed during 
early vision and which contains the infor-
mation in the scene retrieved by early vision 
from it, because the cue does not affect percep-
tual processing but only changes the values of 
some parameters before the onset of perceptual 
processing so that some of the incoming infor-
mation be highlighted. When a hypothesis is 
tested, the evidence in the iconic image can ei-
ther confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. 
Thus, by itself, any attentional cues do not in-
troduce any confirmation bias and, thus, do not 
have any epistemic effects for perception. If the 
facilitated feature/object is present in the visual 
scene, the attentional effect has increased the 
efficiency of perception, which means that it 
has increased its reliability. What is more im-
portant, however, is that information incon-
gruent with the favored hypothesis is included 
in the evidential basis provided by early vision 
so that late vision would have the capability to 
reject the hypothesis based on this evidence in-
dependently of whether it will finally do so. 
This brings us to the epistemic impact of 
CP on late vision, which, as the reader recalls, 
is directly affected by cognition and is, thus, 
CP. Since late vision receives and processes 
the output of early vision, what are the reper-
cussions of the CP of late vision for the way it 
exploits the output of early vision. This is im-
portant because the epistemic role of percep-
tion is mainly determined by late vision, be-
cause it is in late vision that the percept is 
formed and the percept is the crucial factor in 
the epistemic role of perception. If, as I have 
argued and repeat in the next chapter, all hy-
potheses concerning object identity formed in 
late vision are tested against the iconic image 
formed in early vision, the following question 
emerges. Why is it that usually this testing is 
not characterized by any confirmation bias 
since the perceptual system searches the iconic 
image for either confirmatory or disconfirm-
ing clues for the tested hypothesis, while in 
other cases the perceptual system searches the 
image for confirmatory clues while it disre-
gards any disconfirming evidence? In the for-
mer case, the CP of late vision does not epis-
temically downgrade perception, while in the 
latter case it does. 
The fact that the evidential basis, that is, the 
iconic image contains all information present 
in the visual scene entails that when this basis is 
revisited for whatever reason, any evidence 
that was initially disregarded in a case of a con-
firmation bias or of wishful thinking may be 
selected and processed just by cognitively refo-
cusing driven attention to another, initially ne-
glected, part of the iconic image. Upon such a 
revisiting the percept may change, which 
means that the viewer may come to realize that 
things are not as they seemed to be. It follows 
that the initial epistemic downgrade of percep-
tion owing to the CP of late vision can be alle-
viated; the harmful epistemic effects of the CP 
of late vision can be mitigated owing to the fact 
that the iconic image delivered by early vision is 
not cognitively affected in a way that changes 
the processing in early vision. Thus, the epis-
temic downgrade of perception by CP, when it 
occurs, is neither systematic nor intractable, 
and this undercuts constructivism.  
In my attempt to explicate the notion of CP 
an issue arises concerning the relation between 
the two clauses of the proposed definition of CP 
in Chapter 2, that is, the relation between the 
demand that CP occur when cognition affects 
perception directly and the demand that CP oc-




perception, namely the problem concerning the 
relation between the two conditions. After the 
discussion of the epistemic impact of cognition 
on early and late vision, I think that there is a 
sort of a bootstrapping relation between the two 
clauses. A cognitive effect on early vision does 
not threaten its epistemic role because cognition 
does not intervene in the process of retrieval of 
information from the environment and, thus, 
does not diminish the sensitivity of early vision 
to the environment. It follows that the epistemic 
role of early vision is unaffected by cognition be-
cause early vision is not directly affected by cog-
nition since attentional effects influence early 
vision indirectly. But one might wonder why 
these indirect cognitive effects do not entail that 
early vision is CP and the answer to this is that 
by being indirect they do not affect the epistem-
ic role of early vision and the discussion con-
cerning CP is philosophically interesting, as 
many philosophers have argued, only if the cog-
nitive effects on perception undermine its epis-
temic role in grounding or justifying perceptual 
beliefs. This is how, I think, the two conditions 
are intertwined.  
In the last, Fifth, chapter, I discuss the pro-
cesses of early and late vision to determine 
whether they employ discursive inferences. 
This is important because, as the reader re-
calls, internalist discussions about the epis-
temic repercussions of CP on perception pre-
suppose the thesis that perception involves 
inferences. That they do so is an old idea en-
dorsed by both philosophers and psycholo-
gists. Against this, I argue that neither early 
vision nor late vision involve discursive infer-
ences, although there is a philosophically un-
interesting sense in which scientists talk of 
perceptual inferences. Although the non-
inferential process that results in the for-
mation of a recognitional thought can be re-
cast in the form of an argument from some 
premise to a conclusion, this does not entail 
that the formation  of the perceptual thought 
is a piece of reasoning, that is, a transition from 
a set of premises that act as a reason for holding 
the thought to the thought itself. Perceivers can 
be asked why they think that O is F and they 
may reply “because I saw it”. However, this 
does not mean that the reason they cite as a jus-
tification for their thought is a premise from 
which they inferred the thought. They do not 
argue from the thought “I saw it to be thus and 
so” to the thought “it is thus and so”. They just 
formed the thought on the basis of the infor-
mation included in the relevant perceptual 
state in a non-inferential way.  
I also address the issue of whether late vi-
sion, in view of the fact that it is CP and in-
volves concepts, should be deemed properly 
speaking a perceptual stage, or, rather, as a 
thought-like discursive stage. Some philoso-
phers consider that there is a sharp distinction 
between vision and thought and attempt to ex-
plain various phenomena (such as modal and 
amodal completion, or cognitive effects on per-
ception) either as perceptual or thought-based. 
Since there is a hybrid stage of vision/thought 
in which perception and cognition are inter-
mingled, i.e., CP late vision, I argue that late vi-
sion does not involve pure thoughts, and is es-
sentially relying on perceptual information in 
the typical contextual or centered way percep-
tion is tied to the environment. Hence, it is a 
genuine perceptual stage and not a case of visu-





 S. SIEGEL, How is wishful seeing like wishful 
thinking?, in: «Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research», vol. XCV, n. 2, 2017, pp. 408-435, 
here pp. 410-411. 
2
 A. RAFTOPOULOS, Cognitive penetrability and the 
epustemic role of perception, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2019, p. 118. 
3 
Ibid., pp. 120-121. 
4 




RAFTOPOULOS, A. (2019). Cognitive penetra-
bility and the epustemic role of perception, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
SIEGEL, S. (2017). How is wishful seeing like 
wishful thinking?. In: «Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research», vol. XCV, 
n. 2, pp. 408-435. 
